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BOOK REVIEWS

Book Reviews
By GARRARD
1935. pp. xxviii, 1076.

LIQUIDATION.

GLENN.

New York:

BAKER VOORHIS AND COMPANY,

Lindley on Partnershiphas always seemed to me a model legal treatise. Its
field is broad, its approach practical. Lindley concerned himself principally, not with
a prioriprinciples, but with the law in action. He wrote about and criticised what
the courts had done. At the same time with all his references in the text and with
all its abundance of citations, his book did not remotely resemble either a digest or
these modern specialized digests which masquerade as treatises. He made no chapters by tying end to end a series of extracts from the opinions of his judicial contemporaries and predecessors. Whatever one thought about his composition there
was no doubt that Lord Lindley had written a book and had not supervised the
manufacture of one with paste and shears by his clerks and secretaries.
Americans have produced a few notable treatises and numerous worthy monographs in law reviews and elsewhere, dealing with minute segments of the law. In
the field of business law, however, books for the practitioner, in which the author,
although using cases as his raw material, subordinates them to his thought in the
masterly way in which Pound, for example, has handled cases in his essays on Equity,
have been so rare as to be almost non-existent. One began to believe that for an
American to treat any considerable topic of business law on the scale of Lindley's
Partnershipwas perhaps an impossibility. After all, Lord Lindley's task was simple
in comparison. He had one jurisdiction, or two, if one must include Scotland. Lord
Lindley ignored America and the British dominions almost completely. An American
author starts with 48 state jurisdictions and a federal system, which, so great is the
individuality of district judges, sometimes seems to duplicate the States in diversity. The American, too, must not ignore England and he ought not to overlook
Canada.
To carry in solution in one's mind what has been done and said by the courts
of all these jursidictions, after one has accomplished the formidable task of preparatory reading and study, requires mental attainments of absolutely the first
order. To weld this material into an organic whole, to apply it to the daily problems
of the practicing lawyer, and to set down the results in a literate, not to say a literary,
style is an accomplishment so rare that when it occurs it is a real event in American
legal history. The publication of Glenn on Liquidationis such an event.
Mr. Glenn's eminence as a practitioner in New York, his experience as a teacher
at Columbia and Virginia, his meritorious books on Crediors'Rights andFraudulent
Conveyances, remove any elements of surprise from his achievement, but it seems
safe to assert that if he does nothing more at the Bar or in legal scholarship, his
latest volume assures him a permanent reputation as one of the foremost American
legal writers.
This volume in 879 pages, not counting a 77 page table of cases and Mr. Hewson
Michie's excellent index of 117 pages, covers adequately the history and practice of
common law compositions, general assignments, statutory liquidation of banks,
insurance companies and other corporations, equity receiverships, and bankruptcy,
with many helpful analogies drawn from the administration of decedents' estates
especially when decedents' estates were under the control of the Chancellor. The
material is primarily American, but the pages are full of references to English and
Canadian decisions and practices. As some manufactures say of Turkish tobacco
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in their domestic cigarettes, legal history is present in sufficient but not excessive
quantities. The ensemble is no hornbook, but a solid, substantial practitioner's
work of reference. The amazing condension that this implies is due to the omission
of the obvious and the absence of reprinting judicial opinions, statutes and forms
which anyone can find in the reports and form books. If the author had expanded
his material into fifteen volumes he would have added few topics and little of value
that is not available to anyone having access to a good law library.
Topics treated authoritatively and definitely by Mr. Glenn include discussions
o common law and statutory claims, the extent to which an adjudication in bankruptcy operates in rem, allocation of costs in improper insolvency proceedings, and
conflicts of laws and jurisdiction in receivership and bankruptcy. Mr. Glenn, rightly
in my opinion, emphasizes the continued importance of the study of equity receiverships, both for its own sake and as a guide to procedure under the new bankruptcy
reorganization provisions.
Mr. Glenn has no admiration for all the latest developments in bankruptcy.
He praises, with qualifications, Sections 74, 77, 77A and 77B. He does not regard
the FRAZiER-LEMKE ACT (subsection of Section 75) nor Sections 78, 79 and 80, as
bankruptcy legislation. If these are constitutional, Mr. Glenn believes it is only as
emergency moratorium legislation. Of that chaotic concoction, the FRAZIER-LEMKE
ACT, he says, "Plainly this remarkable statute does not relate to bankruptcy and so
cannot be upheld under the bankruptcy power of Congress." Since Mr. Glenn's
book was published, the Supreme Court has held the FRAZtER-LEMKE ACT unconstitutional. 1 His strictures on the municipal bankruptcy sections perhaps are somewhat less convincing. As Mr. Glenn himself states in another connection, "the conception of bankruptcy is not static and never was."
A fundamental point to which Mr. Glenn gives much attention, and about which
not all his observations seem wholly consistent, concerns bankruptcy as a phase of
equity jurisdiction. It is often stated that bankruptcy is purely statutory. On the
other hand Chancery always was willing to exercise a jurisdiction over insolvent
estates. If one regards judicial administration of justice in our legal system as
divided between law and equity, it would seem that bankruptcy is a phase of equity
jurisprudence enormously enlarged and particularized by statute, but still equity.
The problem is of large current importance. A solvent debtor may file a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy. May a bankruptcy court refuse this petition because it
finds the petitioner's conduct in filing it fraudulent or otherwise inequitable? Section
77B requires a petition to be filed in good faith. Is such a requirement to be implied,
though not found in Section 75? A tenant farmer whose lien had expired, and who
had no plans for future tenancy, recently filed a petition under Section 75. His only
property was 100 head of cattle, mortgaged for more than their present value. He
had no plans for caring for the cattle. Could a bankruptcy court reject his petition
as not filed in good faith? I assume Mr. Glenn would reply in the negative. If bankruptcy is a phase of equity, the answer ought to be affirmative. No question, it seems,
requires further study and elucidation before one can assert a competent conclusion.
A reviewer does Mr. Glenn no service if he does not warn the reader that he is apt
to find a number of matters upon which he will be apt to challenge both Mr. Glenn's
logic and his dogmas.
Mr. Glenn is always readable, and while some persons will find mild irritations
in certain individualities of phrase and even spelling, there is much to delight in his
salty observations and witty characterizations: "Now these terms, in personam and
1. Radford v. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank, 55 S. Ct. 855 (1935).
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in rem, have many uses, so many, indeed, thanks to the subtlety of older philosophers,
that a younger school has discarded them in favor of others even more cloud compelling" (p. 415); "One cannot make bookkeeping triumph over law by the process
of incorporating the debit side of an account" (p. 713); "The fundamental duty of
meeting one's obligations, hard though it be, has always involved the penumbral
notion that the creditor is an enemy to be exercised whenever he gets too much on
the debtor's nerves" (p. 723).
The book contains few errors of statement or typography. Of the few of each I
noted, none serious, perhaps one should mention the fact that the former New York
rule that a debt not matured cannot be set-off against a bankrupt has been changed,
or at least modified by statute. The publishers present Mr. Glenn's work in a dignified format, whose pages are a worthy sample of the skill of conservative compositors and printers. Few law library budgets can be so restricted that the librarians
or owners will not find it essential ta have the book on their shelves.
Columbia University Law School
JOHN HANNA
By EDWARD J. WHITE.* St. Louis: THOMAS LAW
1935. pp. xxiv, 422.
Law is as old as civilization. Even the most primitive society could not have
existed without some rules and regulations promulgated and enforced by established
authority. As social order became more complex laws necessarily increased in number and in diversity of application, making more or less systematic codes of law
essential. The oldest of such codes of which we have any knowledge is that of Hammurabi, Babylonian King of some 2000 B. C. But almost as ancient is the Mosaic
code, which has had a greater influence upon civilization than any other code not
even excepting the celebrated and much later code of Justinian. For more than any
other the Mosaic code emphasized the moral principles of law which are essential
to the higher culture in human relations.
Because it is found in the Bible we are apt to think of the Mosaic code as wholly
religious in its nature. It is true, of course, that it is fundamentally religious, but it
formed the constitution of a religion that incorporated within its rules of practice
all the activities of human life. It was therefore a complete code of criminal and civil
law as well as of the forms of religious observance. The Hebrews had no other written
laws and during the centuries of their existence as a political entity it fully served
their purposes as a legal instrument. Moreover, these laws contained the fundamental principles of justice that apply to proper social regulation at all times and in
all circumstances, and the Ten Commandments, which are the core of the Mosaic
code, presents a condensed summary of social and religious prescriptions that if fully
observed today would be of great benefit to civilization.
The Mosaic code therefore is worthy of study by lawyers for its legal principles
alone, if for no other reason, and one eminent lawyer has not only made such a studyof
the code and embodied the results of his meticulous research in a book, but has gonebeyond the code, as expressed in the Pentateuch, to trace the concepts and applications
of law throughout the Bible. It was a tremendous task which Mr. Edward J. White
set out to accomplish, and has accomplished in the publication of his book The Law
in the Scriptures. It is, I believe, unique among books pertaining to law. Mr.
White has carefully "searched the Scriptures" for passages of a legal nature or implication and reproduced each with comment that he regards as appropriate, and
THE LAW IN THE SCRIPTURES.

BooK

COMPANY,

*Mr. White passed on while this review was in the press.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1936

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1936], Art. 13

z MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
with numerous citations that reveal the great extent of his reading in the history
and principles of law in general. It is a singular book, because of its uniqueness; and
it is illuminating and interesting, because it brings before the reader the legal as well
as the religious aspects of the greatest of all codes in the greatest of all books.
An example of Mr. White's work in this volume is the following comment on
"Compensation for Assault" provided for in Exodus 21:18-19:
"This, under modern jurisprudence, would be called the law of compensation
for an injury and expense resulting from a common assault.
"In all cases of assault and battery, damages are allowed, as nearly as possible
to the consequences which have ensued, and those likely to ensue therefrom, and it is
competent to consider the pain and suffering of the wounded person, as well as the
amount expended to be cured. It will be noted this modern rule for allowance for
damages, in such cases is practically the same that obtained among the Hebrews
1490 years B. C." (p. 72).
The author of this book is obviously a devout Christian who handles his subject
with appropriate reverence. While he applies to it the acumen and the learning of the
trained and scholarly lawyer, he accepts the orthodox views of the authorship and
dates of the various books of the Bible and is not troubled by the conclusions of
modern critical research in that field. One may disagree with this position without
lessened appreciation of his fine accomplishment in this contribution to the bibliography of historical law.
Mr. White is one of the leading railroad lawyers of the country, having been
vice-president and general solicitor of the Missouri Pacific system and he is now
chief attorney for its trustees. He is the author of The Law in Shakespeare, Legal
Antiquities and Legal Traditions,from which it can be gathered that this is not
his first excursion into the field of law as it is expressed in history and literature.
St. Louis

CASPER S. YosT

THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES. By GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT. Kansas City,
VERNON LAW BOOK COMPANY; St. Paul: WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY, 1935.
pp. 4601. 7 Vols.
Here is a work that should take its place with the best treatises in American legal
literature. In few main divisions of our law, except in torts, has there been so conspicious a lack of an adequate text as in trusts. Up to this time the chief stand-by
of lawyers, judges and teachers has been Perry's two volumes. But Perry's work
was first published in 1872; even then it merely followed Lewin's earlier work, while
its growth by accretion at the hands of successive editors, who cast subsequent editions in the original mold, neither improved its coherence nor removed its flavor of
ancient vintage. As for Professor Bogert's Handbook which appeared some fifteen
years ago, though an excellent book for its purpose and one of the best books of the
early Hornbook series, it was obviously not meant to fill the gap in the Trust field.
Its excellence did, however, lead us to hope for more from the same author.
The hope is amply realized in this new seven volume work. Of these seven
volumes, text and notes account for the first four, a total of 2942 pages. Volumes
5 and 6 are devoted exclusively to 792 pages of forms, while the index and table of
cases make up the remaining volume of 867 pages. The greater part of the first two
volumes deal mainly with the creation and purposes of express trusts, including
business and charitable trusts; specialized problems in the administration of both the
atter types are also covered. Some of the outstanding laudable features of this part
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of the work are: the analysis of the use of the trust as a device in our economic life; a
superb chapter by Professor Katz and the author on business trusts (the best summary of this field which has come to the reviewer's attention; one only wishes it had
been expanded); the often neglected but highly important matter of taxation in
relation to trusts, without knowledge of which a lawyer is not qualified properly to
serve his client in setting up a trust. There follows a treatment of resulting and constructive trusts, which takes the author well into the third volume. The remainder of
volume 3 and a large part of volume 4 is devoted to administration. This means that
nearly 36 of the textual part concerns administration-an emphasis which the reviewer heartily indorses. That is the aspect of trusts which the practicing lawyer
meets more than any other and which has been neglected in texts and law schools
in favor of the imposing ancient learning. Administration is followed by the relation
of third parties to the trust and finally by termination. It is at once apparent that
this organization follows orthodox lines; it is (except for new material) substantially
the same organization followed in several case books.
The excellent features of this work are many. The reviewer will undertake to
enumerate but a few. (1) As might be surmised from what has already been said
about the proportion dedicated to administration, here is a treatise written with an
eye to daily use by practically-minded lawyers. History (and this in a field where
history's importance has been traditionally magnified) is relegated to its proper
position. Decidedly, Professor Bogert does not emulate the Wak-Ta-Doo, the bird
that flies backwards because it is more interested in where it has been than in where
it is going. (2) In no sense is this a scissors and paste-pot job. He never resorts to
what Cardozo calls the "tonsorial" or "agglutinative" style-that "dreary succession
of quotations" of which a few writers (and many courts) are guilty. (3) The author
is seldom dogmatic; he doesn't consider that his function is to state what "the" law
is and not to say why. He gives arguments pro and con, including his own wellanalysed views (e. g., his treatment of bank collections, swollen assets, spendthrift
trusts). (4) The citation of law review articles and notes is exhaustive. Thus, in a
single note with reference to tracing trust property, he cites 5 leading articles and
34 law review notes. It is increasingly realized that in many fields the best legal
work is to be found in legal periodicals. Even the most conservative courts are getting
over the idea that they must cite only works bound in buckram three inches thick.
(5) The author has not looked solely to legal material. His chapter on "Various
Trust Functions", especially, is replete with references to extra-legal literature. (6)
The work is well proportioned. Even the traditionally over-emphasized distinguishing of a trust from other legal institutions occupies no more than one eighteenth of
the text. (7) The author has caught even the minute statutes of the different jurisdictions dealing with trusts. This makes the work not only a handy reference for purely
local work but also for comparative study. (8) Though the author was for a while an
adviser in drafting the Restatement of Trusts, his treatise is not an apologia for the
Restatement. Indeed, it seldom refers to the Restatement except at the beginning of
each chapter. The reviewer mentions this not as an aspersion upon the Restatement,
but as evidence that the treatise is the author's work, not that of the American Law
Institute. (9) The forms set out in volumes 5 and 6 are judiciously chosen and cover
many situations that are of every day occurrence. Of course, no one need be told
that these forms are not adapted to any and all needs that a client may have. (10)
Even the index has been drawn with such care that the pertinent parts of the text can
be found with a minimum of time. (11) Perhaps the best feature of all is its clarity
and simplicity. The reviewer does not recall a single sentence that is not perfectly
intelligible at first reading. The author talks lawyers' language. There is no intellectual "showing off."
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One cannot fail to notice throughout the work the author's intransigence with
the "integrity of the trust institution". According to the author's thesis, a trust is
inherently composed of certain elements (i. e., intent, res, cestui, etc.); when those
elements are present, you have a trust; remove, substantially, any one of those
elements and you have no trust nor has any court, in that event, any business saying
that there is a trust. The reviewer's only criticism of this is that the trust concept
is but a preliminary step, and at times but an inadequate one, in solving some narrower issue. That narrow issue may be whether a remedy is barred by the statute of
limitations, whether a creditor shall be given priority on insolvency, or any one of a
dozen other issues. That the court finds a "trust" where the uncle tells the nephew
that he "had the money in the bank.. .for you... I don't intend to interfere with this
money", and thus makes applicable a longer period of limitation, though no trust res
was ever identified,1 does not mean that the nephew would have been entitled to
priority in case of the uncle's insolvency. The finding of a "trust", notwithstanding
obstacles of intent or res, in bank collection cases doesn't mean that those elements
are immaterial elsewhere; it means that in the opinion of the court (probably erroneous, as the author points out, although that's immaterial for this point), the
forwarder should be given priority as a matter of policy (as is often demonstrated
by statutes) and, that since the common law is deficient in failing ta provide any
other device to give that priority, the court will torture the trust concept. So too
with priorities in "swollen assets" cases. Fully as important as the integrity of the
trust institution would be a study of the classification of the creditors whom the
courts strain to prefer. Again, the author disfavors honorary trusts as "an attempt
to alter one of the basic ideas of the trust". Well, suppose we say, then, so much the
worse for the basic idea, in the peculiar circumstances where such trusts are recognized. Law, as well as life, has to compromise now and then. The reviewer doesn't
take the position that everytime a court is in a jam, it can work out its salvation
by manufacturing a trust. Somewhere between this attitude, however, and he inviolable integrity of the trust concept lies what courts do in fact and will continue
to do-a matter which lawyers cannot afford to overlook. In an ideal legal world,
with perfect rules about limitations of actions, priorities of creditors, procedure,
and everything else, we could probably form a trust concept and stick to it mercilessly.
Different persons look for different things in a new book. The reviewer's legal
experience having been largely in the field of corporation finance, he had hoped for a
more extensive treatment of the trustee under corporate trust mortgages. Here is a
large field to which the author pays only passing attention. What of exculpatory
clauses, the right of trustee to file proof of claim for bondholders, joinder of bondholders with the trustee in foreclosure, duty of the trustee or fiduciary committee to
disclose lists of bondholders, the anomalous position of a "trustee" under an unsecured debenture issue, etc. Perhaps the author felt that this sort of material could
better be dealt with in works on corporations, e. g. volume 7 of Fletcher's recent
treatise. In the passing treatment he does give, the author dismisses rather summarily the idea that the status of a trustee under a corporate trust mortgage securing
bonds held by the public may be different from that of an ordinary trustee. Maybe
there is no difference, who knows for sure, as yet? But the point can be too readily
taken for granted. Trusts, as well as contracts, "by adhesion" may prove suigeneris.
One might also wish for more discussion of gratuitous partial assignments of
unevidenced choses in action, in the light of cases like Chase National Bank v.
1.

Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538, 27

N. E. 256 (1891).
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Sayles,2 else someone is sure to try to save the day for die-hard fundamentalism by
pointing out that because of the seal alone was the assignment in that case irrevocable. In fact, it is obvious that the seal did not at all account for that decision.
Manifestly, the foregoing criticisms detract but little from the greatness of this
work. Nor does its merit suffer seriously from the absence of dates in the citation
of cases or in the fact that the forms which could very well have been put into a single
volume of 792 pages, have been padded into two volumes.
To conclude, Professor Bogert's work, with its keen analysis, scholarly presentation and exhaustive citation of over 22,000 cases and hundreds of statutes will be
an almost necessary addition to the lawyer's library. 3 That it is indispensable to
law teachers was brought home to the reviewer when the work first came out: it
immediately proved a great time-saver in preparing for class-room discussion.
Missouri University Law School

ELvIN R. LATrY

2d ed., by WM. M. HEPBURN, and ARCHIBALD H.
St. Paul: WEST PUBLISHING CO., 1935. pp. xxxl, 1071.

HEPBURN'S CASES ON TORTS,
THROCKMORTON.

This new casebook in the American Casebook Series replaces the first edition,
which was prepared by the late Professor Charles M. Hepburn, the father of one of
the present editors, and was first published in 1915. It conforms in physical features
to the excellent quality of type, binding and mechanical detail characteristic of the
current volumes of the American Casebook Series.
The present reviewer never used the first edition of this book as class-room
material. Neither has he used the present edition. The observations that follow are
made, therefore, without that basis for appraisal of the materials obtained through
their use in actual class-room teaching which is most highly desirable in attempting
to evaluate a case book as a tool for use in teaching law. The present reviewer has,
however, attempted to make a careful examination of the materials compiled in the
present volume.
The subject of torts, however in detail conceived and classified, covers a
vast field of human activity involving harmful interference with others. The
facts involved in human activity are continually changing. So, too, but more
slowly, standards of morality and justice and current ideas about human welfare are continually developing according to new emphases and changing directions occasioned by their impact with the continually changing external facts. The
application of the principles of the law of torts to these ever active and continually
changing facts of practical life in the process of the administration of justice according to law involves a continuous process of adaptation. There are, accordingly,
numerous divergent ways of approaching the subject of torts. One man's review
of another's casebook on torts is therefore likely to be, at least in considerable part,
a reflection of what the reviewer thinks such a casebook ought to be.
2. 11 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A. 1st., 1926).
3. As an example of the warm reception
which this work will undoubtedly receive
from practicing attorneys the reviewer takes
the liberty of quoting from a communication the reviewer has received from a trust
company officer of rich experience: "Dean
Bogert has had so many contacts with
I awyers in active practise that he has been

able to approach this work from a practical
angle which adds greatly to its value to us
trust men in our every day work. That is
to say, instead of drawing his material
wholly from dry cases, he has drawn some
of it from living cases -from the raw material with which we trust men have to work
day after day."
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The editors of the present casebook apparently felt bound very largely to follow
in the present edition, as did the original editor of the first edition, an analysis and
organization largely patterned partly on the Cooley tradition and partly on the model
of the old casebook of Ames and Smith. Given the task of preparing a casebook
on such a patchwork pattern growing as it were out of the Cooley tradition for this
subject, the task thus undertaken has been very well done. From that viewpoint
much may be said in hearty appreciation of this new casebook. It covers the
subject-matter traditionally included in the course in torts. It does so with a
group of cases and notes so selected and edited as to make possible the completion of the course as outlined in the time usually allotted to this subject in the
larger university law schools. It does so with cases frequently selected from the grist
of recent judicial action, thus exemplifying the current application of underlying
principles through vivid illustrations taken from the range of facts which are popularly familiar. Like its predecessor, the first edition, it includes valuable usable materials on trover and conversion, and also on the important and difficult but much
neglected topic of nuisance.
From a careful examination of the materials included, compiled here on a pattern apparently so largely growing out of the Cooley tradition, the present reviewer
feels very certain that a course on torts may be very effectively presented through use
of this casebook. An instructor, vividly interested in the fascinating subject of torts,
can utilize very effectively the excellent material here presented whether or not he
personally is a devoted adherent of the Cooley tradition.
The present reviewer believes, however, that adherence to the Cooley tradition
in the analysis and organization of the subject of torts is at the present time a handicap tending to impair efficiency in the application of the law to the facts as they
currently arise. The present reviewer believes that such comprehensive underlying
analysis and organization of the subject of torts as is exemplified by Dean Wigmore
and Dean Pound in their respective casebooks on the subject is highly significant
from the standpoint of ascertaining the merits and grasping the bearings of its current problems of application. This general type of underlying analysis and organization indicating the broad differences between the three underlying types of tort
liability, too, seems now to be largely followed in the recent scholarly work presented in the American Law Institute Restatement of Torts. The comparatively
unorganized and unrelated mass of particulars strung along or jumbled together
in the American classic text of Cooley on Torts seems by comparison little more
than a conglomerate of raw materials. True, more recent editions of that classic
work have included certain variations, adaptations and additions of detail. These
occasional changes, however, still leave the Cooley text essentially following the
original Cooley tradition.
The present casebook varies somewhat from its predecessor, the first edition,
in its scheme of organization. Also it is not as disorganized as is the Cooley text
itself. It still seems designed, however, essentially to follow a sort of combination
of the Cooley pattern and the pattern of the old casebook of Ames and Smith. One
looks in vain in this casebook for a general organization of the materials recognizing
the underlying analysis indicating the three broad underlying types of tort liability,
that for intentional interference, that for negligent interference, and that for unintended non-negligent interference involving liability without fault. The now well
known works of Pound and Wigmore and the current work of the American Law Institute Restatement of Torts have made that underlying analysis of the subject of
torts so familiar that it seems to this reviewer very strange to find a new casebook on
the subject organized on a patchwork pattern conspicuously minimizing if not
substantially ignoring that underlying analysis. Built on the patchwork pattern
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which apparently dictated the organization of the materials here included this book
is nevertheless a book affording large possibilities of effective use. It seems a pity
that a book containing so much of good materials could not have been built on a
better pattern.

University of Nebraska Law School

MODEL LAWS FOR PLANNING

LAWRENCE VOLD

CITIES, COUNTIES, AND STATES

(including Zoning,

Subdivision Regulation, and Protection of Official Map). By
BASSErr, FRANK

Cambridge,

B.

WILLIAMS, ALFRED BETTMAN
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1935. pp.

EDWARD M.
WHITTEN.

and ROBERT
VIII, 137.

Before 1900 there were few attempts to plan American cities. Between 1900 and
1925 a great majority of American cities appointed city planning commissions which
undertook various forms of planning work. These commissions were purely advisory
bodies, and the plans which they prepared had no official character. Since 1925 the
scope of city planning has enlarged rapidly to include county planning, regional
planning and state planning.
In order that the work of the various planning agencies in each area of government be not wasted, there have been various attempts to give official character to
plans and planning commissions. This is not an easy task. Planning is not a compartmented governmental activity which can be delegated to some existing department of government. Planning involves coordination of existing governmental
functions. The process of bringing about such a coordinative process and the devising
of practical methods of procedure necessitate the most careful legal draftsmanship
in the preparation of laws authorizing the creation of planning commissions and defining the scope of their activities. The present book endeavors to clarify thinking
on this subject and to establish certain standards of practice.
The Harvard University School of City Planning, under whose auspices this
book was prepared, most wisely requested several authorities well versed in the legal
aspects of city planning to participate in the preparation of this book. No single
standard formula has been produced. Rather, numerous enabling acts are suggested for municipal planning, for municipal zoning, for county planning, for county
zoning, for regional planning, and for state planning. Certain other important special
matters are discussed, such as the control of land planning, discretionary powers of
boards of appeal, the combination of planning and zoning powers, overlapping
jurisdiction of planning agencies, and the like.
It is significant that the authors do not agree as to the powers and functions of
planning agencies and methods of procedure. Messrs. Bassett and Williams represent
one point of view. Mr. Whitten agrees for the most part with Mr. Bettman, but
makes an excellent separate statement in the latter part of the book as to his conception of the planning function and methods of implementation.
Unquestionably we are to witness a continued extension of the planning function in all areas of government. Sound legislation is needed. This book will be of
great value to public officials, lawyers and citizens concerned with this interesting
new form of public activity.

St. Louis

HARLAND BARTHOLOMEW
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BUILDING LINES AND RESERVATIONS FOR FUTURE STREETS.

BLACK, assisted by MARY HEDGES BLACK.

Cambridge:

By RUSSELL VAN NEST

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

PRESS, 1935. pp. ix, 243.
This book is most timely in view of the fact that there is scarcely a city in this
country which is not concerned with traffic problems. The advent of the automobile
necessitates redesign of antiquated street systems through some method which is
equitable and which does not involve excessive cost.
Experience in establishing building lines and providing future street reservations
in local governmental units of this country has been based upon two methods of
procedure, namely, first, the outright taking of land and buildings (eminent domain
procedure); and, second, the public control of private building operations within
areas needed for future new streets or street widenings (the police power procedure).
The purpose of this research is to present the several methods of control used
in various jurisdictions (municipal, county and state) and to appraise the practicability, both administrative and economic, of these various methods of procedure.
Following a brief review of state legislative acts, consisting of police power acts,
zoning enabling acts, eminent domain acts and acts combining both eminent domain
and police power procedure, Mr. Black analyzes the experiences of numerous
cities. In the early stages of American governmental history, the right of a com-

munity to proceed under the police power to prevent the erection of buildings in
mapped streets (i. e., proposed future streets) was accepted as a matter of course
in several eastern states. But as the courts became fearful lest the fundamental
doctrine of the sacredness of property rights would be encroached upon by this
dubious concept of taking property without just compensation, decision followed
decision in declaring unconstitutional the exercise of the police power for such purpose. Pennsylvania courts alone consistently upheld the constitutionality of police
power procedure. Philadelphia's method of control over one hundred years ago
was to formulate a plan providing for the widening of existing streets and the
creation of new streets, and to incorporate this plan in a map which was then officially adopted by the city council. The General Plan Act of Pennsylvania (passed
in 1891) embodies the same simple language which has for all these years been
successful in that state:
"No person shall hereafter be entitled to recover any damages for any
buildings or improvements of any kind which shall or may be placed or
constructed upon or within the lines of any located (mapped) street or
alley, after the same shall have been located or ordained by councils"
(p. 73).
The long experience which Pennsylvania has had with the police power procedure indicates what manner of success may be had with this method of control.
During this period in which Pennsylvania courts were sustaining the validity
of the police power procedure, municipalities in other states desiring to provide for
street widenings and/or new streets, were attempting other solutions, chiefly by
modified forms of eminent domain procedure. Any eminent domain method of procedure, however, has great economic as well as administrative defects, although some
few cities have employed it with limited success. Where it is desired to widen a street
at some future time, cities using the eminent domain method of procedure must
acquire easements. This requires an immediate and usually large financial outlay
because of a pernicious tendency of appraisers and juries to make unjustifiable
awards to property owners. A second award must also be made at the time of acquisition of the fee.
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It is worthy to note that in Mr. Black's examples as to cost under eminent domain procedure for street widenings, the average damage involved for cutting off
or setting back buildings amounted to more than twice the cost of the land. Had
building lines been established prior to the improvement this disproportionate figure
could, in a large number of cases, have been materially reduced.
The establishment of building lines under zoning ordinances without compensation for easement appears to be increasingly popular. Wherever this method has been
used, it has been based upon the assumption that adequate width of streets and space
between buildings fronting upon proposed street widenings, are just as much in the
interests of "public health, safety, morals and general welfare" as is the preservation
of front yards in residential districts. Zoning building lines, Mr. Black points out, are
much more successful than those established under eminent domain.
In the conclusions to his chapter entitled "Eminent Domain versus the Police
Power," after observing the indications of a widespread increasing use of the police
power for protecting street widening lines and future street reservations, Mr. Black
states: "Of the failure of eminent domain procedures to provide the needed protection there can be no doubt. Neither is there any uncertainty among those who have
given special study to municipal problems as to the necessity of winning full accepance of the police power principles in protecting street and highway reservations if
the public is ever to be provided with adequate street and highway systems at reasonable cost" (p. 116).
In the concluding sentences of this book, Mr. Black makes this significant comment: ".... the issue seems fairly drawn upon the one simple question: Is the restriction of the use of private property for the protection of adequate street systems a
legitimate use of the police power as understood and accepted by present day
society? Sooner or latcr, distinction between methods upon the grounds oJ relative
legality will be brushed aside, and meihod will remain important only in respect to its
relative adaptabilityto local conditions and customs.1
"More important and more significant is the growing recognition that, along
with the benefits derived from community integration of property, there is imposed
upon property and its owners the obligation of sharing the responsibilities of integration and of maintaining that integration through the processes of change and development. Streets, adequate in width and plan, are essential to community life.
New standards-of capacity, alignment, and costliness of improvement-have been
imposed on streets by new developments, chief among them the automobile. Costs of
remodeling established street systems are great, oftentimes prohibitive. The remedy
lies in amelioration and prevention, first through planning and then through protection of plan. The protection of reservations for street widenings and for new streets is
perhaps the most important element in the protection of plan. Methods of protection
are still a little uncertain and perhaps a little crude, but as to need there is no uncertainty. Methods are evolving and will be perfected" (pp. 166-167).
Mr. Black has gathered in this research an extensive fund of information concerning procedure and experience, representing a national survey of the most typical
cities and counties. While recognizing that the task of most effectively presenting
this somewhat complicated material to the reader is difficult in the extreme, his
geographical method of presentation tends toward the miscellany.
The appendices are a most valuable collection of information for use both in
annotating this volume as well as for separate study on the subject. They include
1. Italics those of reviewer. Mr. Black italicized the sentence previous.
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excerpts from model legislative forms, state legislation and city and county ordinances.
This volume is the eighth of the Harvard City Planning Series and should be
read in conjunction with volume seven of the series, entitled Model Laws For Planning Cities, Counties and Slates, by Messrs. Bassett, Williams, Bettman and Whitten.

St.
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